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Micronations in Space and Time, Form and Flux by Irina Ulrike Andel, 2010

Micronations in Space and Time, Form and Flux*

Irina Ulrike Andel



As a general term, “micronation” is in most cases applied to entities that claim political, social, economic and/or judicial autonomy, yet which do not always embrace the notion of a nation. We are dealing here not with a homogenous phenomenon, but with several different groups encompassing various interests and ideas. The term can be applied to role-playing games or artistic projects, but also to criminal organizations.[1] Hence it can be quite difficult to determine whether one is dealing with ‘serious’ political enterprises or rather with role-playing games developed as a hobby.[2]

Micronations are literally “small nations.” Since the label is an umbrella term, usually used more as an attribution by others than a self-attribution, it must be noted that it is often viewed as inadequate. To critics, its nominal proximity to the concept of nationalism carries negative connotations, especially if a particular self-declared state has no intention of founding a nation in the sense of a national collective. Furthermore, micronations can take on large proportions in terms of territory and/or population. The “micro” prefix implies a certain “smallness” of these entities, alluding more to micronations’ fields of influence in global terms than to their actual dimensions. For the most part, the foundation of micronations involves the creation of new states (or nations) in the form of do-it-yourself projects. These are accompanied by proclamations of sovereignty and autonomy, which find their expression in declarations of independence and constitutions. Yet many of these self-declared states receive little or no attention, and not all of them aspire to independence and political recognition.


Micronations already existed before the idea of the nation, as we know it today, was born. It may even be possible to identify the phenomenological roots of micronations in the first forms of human organization in groups. Yet their ideologies can also be traced back to the ideological characteristics of the early utopian communities of America, as it was also a goal of the latter to found independent communities within majority societies.

Utopian communities had their roots in Europe[3] and were based on voluntary alliances formed in order to realize particular ideals within the particular groups. They were often characterized as sects[4] and one feature they all shared was a deep mistrust of every secular power. Since many of these so-called sects were persecuted in Europe, America offered them the opportunity to realize their notions of community and practice their forms of religious belief.

The success of these groups drew the attention of several social reformers of the Enlightenment. Travelers to America visited these “utopian communities” and reported on their achievements. They suggested imitating the models of these religious sects and converting them into secular forms.

America was the new Promised Land across the sea where many people saw the chance for a new beginning. Robert Owen was one of many to arrive on the new continent with high hopes:

“I am coming to this country to introduce an entire new system of society; to change it from an ignorant selfish system to an enlightend social system which shall gradually unite all interests into one, and remove all causes for contest between individuals.”

The great freedom that America offered at the time was the freedom to experiment with new practices and institutions. In the mid-19th century, the small experimental community was viewed as vanguard of the future.[5] These various communities shared the idea of secession, and the formation of agriculturally and economically autonomous entities. It was a network within which various social and economic experiments could be conducted in the light of knowledge – a social laboratory.


Micronations based on libertarian ideas were formed for the most part with financial motives in mind or to develop their own forms of financial organization centered on their desired lifestyles. Adherents of early libertarianism were devoted to uninhibited human freedom of thought and freedom in all human action. Reflections of these ideals can be found in those of free love, resistance to the state, anarchism, and many more. To libertarians, the ideal society is one of free, autonomous individuals, with minimum interference by the state. In the worst case, these views are understood as egotistic and hedonistic, as an ideological legitimization of greed and as a license for the rich to exploit the poor. Since the absolute right to private property represents the central core of libertarianism, it has been considered an “anarchism of the rich.”

At the end of the 1960s, the ideas of the utopian communities of the 19th century were revived and their adherents joined forces with libertarians. A group centered on the author Ayn Rand grew in influence. Ayn Rand and her novel Atlas Shrugged (1957) became sources of inspiration to many micronations. In this work, which received more attention in America than in Europe, Rand describes what would happen if the rich, powerful personalities of society were to disappear. Due to the philosophy of Objectivism developed within it, the book became an influential political work. Ayn Rand champions the state form of “laissez-faire capitalism” and rejects any further state intervention in individuals’ lives.

As the Cold War ensured that states became weaker, many libertarians decided to emigrate in order to live out their ideas. Jon Fisher wrote the book, Last Frontiers on Earth – Strange Places Where You Can Live Free (1980), which served as a guide to living in polar regions, caves, ghost towns and deserts, and to hiding within cities.

Yet this “out of sight”[6] approach had little appeal to libertarians since they wish to live free, but hold that this should be achieved through financial means, hence requiring unlimited access to markets. To be independent of anyone’s grace, financial prosperity was essential.


To founders of “new states,” the distinction of the “high seas” as being free from any state influence or ownership forms the basis of the idea of constituting floating states in international waters, since many of these founders search for “unoccupied” regions of the world. Four ways of realizing freedom have been developed, all of them connected to the ocean:


  • the appropriation of unclaimed islets;
  • the promulgation of sovereignty over reefs or low-tide elevations;
  • the creation of states in shallow waters by dumping;
  • the erection of empires in artificial platforms; [7]

In terms of international law, a special area of maritime law is of particular interest here. Rights in national and international waters are regulated in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982.[8] “According to Article 87, Section 1 of the UNCLOS, the high seas are “open,” i.e. they belong to no state; claims of sovereignty made by individual states are expressly prohibited according to Article 89. Since they belong to no one, the high seas can only be utilized for peaceful purposes (UNCLOS, Art. 88).”[9]


Both groups, the utopian communists and the libertarians, believed that the societies that surrounded them were doomed to failure, but their reasoning differed. The idea of social transformation advanced by utopian communists is based on an extensive imitation of their successful micro-societies. Taking the principles of a small-scale experiment as a starting point, the entire world could be transformed into a unified utopia.

In contrast, libertarians reject any notion of a unified utopia and suggest a wide range of experimental, sovereign, micro-societies that enter the free market of utopia.

This notion of the free choice of, and competition among, forms of government and statehood is by no means a new one. In 1860, De Puydt formulated a text that Max Nettlau elaborated on in 1909.[10] The idea developed there became known as “panarchy.” Both authors suggested that the law of free competition could be applied not only to the commercial world, but to the political world as well. They both felt that a fundamental freedom was lacking, namely the freedom to choose whether one wants to be free or not free.


In the mid-1990s, the growing popularity of the World Wide Web made it possible to form state-like entities with little time and effort and with the aid of a purely electronic medium. More and more purely online, fantasy or simulation-based micronations appeared. The network relations that result are by no means cold and sterile, and do not exclude strong feelings,[11] as Pierre Levy observes: “On the other hand, neither individual responsibility nor public opinion and public judgment disappear in cyberspace. Moreover, net communication rarely simply replaces bodily encounters – in most cases, it serves as their extension or tool;”[12]


Due to growing awareness of them, interest in the phenomenon of micronations has increased in the last few years. Newspaper articles, such as those published in the online magazine Wired[13] or in the New York Times,[14] present it to a larger audience. New states, kingdoms or principalities are proclaimed with increasing frequency, rendering the huge amount of information on them virtually unmanageable. Cataloging the micronations currently in existence has hence become almost impossible and any attempt should be considered only a snapshot.


New information technology creates new opportunities for micronations to influence the norms of participation and the borders between “insiders” and “outsiders” in public spaces. The internet offers a practical platform for many diverse communities of interest. Internet micronations (IMNs) represent a form of these interest-communities that nevertheless differs from that of other online communities in an essential aspect: IMNs suggest transforming the entire concept of national identity from a territorially bound into a de-territorialized form. Hence, net pioneers soon utilized the possibilities of creating alternative forms of affiliation in cyberspace. To a certain degree, these could become more relevant than the model of the nation-state.

“As Dillon (1988: 14), following Wittgenstein (1983) and Foucault (1979), points out, language ‘makes rather than (merely) reflects life’, and this holds for all social discourses that shape and constrain the way people live their lives. In other words, ‘to speak is to act and to act is to exercise power’. Information technology is therefore a medium for the exercise of power.”[15]

As the global economy grows ever more dependent on a global electronic communications system, the systematic exclusion from such a source, and from the market for information, leads to increasing divergence. This occurs not only because of one-sided, economic advantages in international competition, but also because of access to the means needed to effectively, politically and economically, participate in the global system.[16]


Physical, real micronations are hard to distinguish from landless, virtual nations, since the territorial claims and notions of micronations vary considerably. Many nation-founders develop new concepts of (state) territories in which their physical reality is expanded to the sphere of virtual reality. Virtual communities are hence independent of geographical proximity or institutional affiliations. They realize themselves through common interests, knowledge, and projects of cooperation or exchange and are sustained by the connection of everything with everything.[17] “If anything, the image of the lonely person sitting in front of his computer screen reflects a phantasm rather than a sociological fact.”[18]

The boundaries between the worlds of virtual construction and the world of real encounters are in a constant state of flux. The question must be posed as to the ‘real’ aspects of micronations since e.g. cybernations also claim territory and/or disk space. Hence, the determining factor is not (only) territory. The global proliferation of the internet confronts us with new forms of identity structures by which communities define themselves in terms of the information they command or don’t command. The various relations between online identities raise further questions about the internet, globalization, and the philosophical implications of hypertext.


When does a state become a state?


If micronations have the potential to develop into nations and possibly achieve the quality of states, the question must be raised as to when a state becomes a state. For many, secession, the separation of a region from a state that continues to exist, is seen as a possibility of founding a new state of one’s own. In terms of international law, a population’s right to self-determination is brought to bear in this case.

The question of state quality and hence also the sovereignty of a state presents manifold challenges to micronations as well as to the practice of international law. It often represents the most significant factor along the path of becoming a state. A contemporary example is Palestine, which has a largely self-administrating status, yet is legally subject to Israel’s authority. The principle of state equality is derived from state sovereignty: “There is no legal hierarchy of states. The state of Vanuatu is just as important as the USA. This principle is codified in Article 2, Number 1 of the United Nations Charter.”[19]

Along with several other factors, the greatest obstacle to micronations pursuing statehood is achieving recognition from other states and the international community. Many micronations refer to the Montevideo Convention of 1993 as a legitimization of their existence. In Article 1 of this convention on the rights and duties of states, the tri-element doctrine has been defined. Along with the requirements of having a government, a state territory and a permanent population belonging to it, it names a further defining criterium as being the capacity to enter relations with other states. Micronations can possess territories (living rooms, artificial platforms in the ocean, occupied areas, virtual, conceptual, and much more), populations (usually voluntary “citizens in exile”), and forms of government. Yet the question is whether the ability to enter into inter-state relations should be considered a primary element of statehood.[20]



“Recognition is not a game that is won once, and for all;

there are losses and gains for each new set of players.”[21]


Some micronations claim to have gained de facto recognition from other states.[22] Recognition is an essential factor in the credibility of a newly founded state and determines the stability of the new government and the role it plays in the international arena. The criteria of recognition of new states can vary from state to state. In principle, states proceed from the tri-element doctrine. However, a state or international organization can stipulate additional conditions (e.g. compliance with the UN Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

“In the case of de jure recognition, the recognized state fulfills all criteria of statehood in the opinion of the recognizing state. De facto means that the recognizing state is still unsure in this regard, but believes that the recognized state provisionally fulfills these criteria.”[23]

On the other hand, recognition of states must be differentiated from recognition of governments, where the exercise of sovereignty is the central issue. It becomes relevant in cases of extra-constitutional change of government and is related to the question of recognizing revolutionary groups that control a particular territory. Yet the recognition of a government says nothing about its legitimacy. Hence, a change of government does not affect the recognition of a state per se. [24]


“The validity of a law is ultimately based on the will of a sovereign or on the abstract application of a supreme unquestionable basic norm. It thereby no longer depends on the discursive justification of the validity of concrete legal arrangements. In this conception of the modern legal system, state and law are conceptual allies. Indeed, empirical observation does not bear up against the ideal of a monopoly of state power and of uniform law.”[25]


Conclusion


The various aspects of state construction of micronations combine the parameters of international law and lived reality with utopian visions. The contrasted groups produce similar symbols and objects, yet they occupy different positions in social space. The foundation of micronations offers various possibilities of communicating new conceptions of social organization. They render apparent how symbols and bodies of knowledge can be individually and collectively constituted and reproduced.

Diverse artistic state projects reveal various political and social challenges within states or on a global level. By disclosing the unequal conditions of access to political codetermination and by voicing anti-capitalist systemic criticism in many cases, micronations can open new spaces of participation.

Micronations are often not considered to be ‘real,’ yet their lived reality is evidenced in the fields of action they are instrumental in expanding.


“Far from being the radical edge of a new wave of rightist nationalist fervor which outside observers would be right to fear, micronationalism in its modern form is part of a process of growing internationalism and human brotherhood. Even where a micronation operates a far from left-wing government, and encourages cultural patriotism, at its core it remains part of a left-wing movement. The government of a micronation is always democratic, because it is a government based on free choice. The strongest ‘nation’ in the micronational world is the micronational community itself, as a whole.”[26]



Bibliography


BAKER, Chris

2009 Live Free or Drown: Floating Utopias on the Cheap. Wired Magazine, 17.02, 19.01.2009. [Online: http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/magazine/17-02/mf_seasteading? currentPage=3 26.06.2010].


BESCHIZZA, Rob

2007 The Pirate Bay Seeks to Buy Sealand. Wired Magazine, 15. Jan. 2007. [Online: http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2007/01/the_pirate_bay_/ 26.06.2010].


BLUMBERG, Alex

2000 It’s Good to be King – There’s no need to be disenfranchised. Just start your own nation. Wired Magazine, 8.03., März 2000

[Online: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.03/kingdoms.html? pg=1&topic=&topic_set= 26.06.2010].


CUTTERHAM, Tom

Micronationalism as a Left Wing Phenomenon. The Kay Frances Inaugural Literature Contest. Zugriff über www.archive.org: [Online:

http://web.archive.org/web/20040407105638/http://www.geocities.com/principality_lavalon/essay_comp.htm#cutterham 25.10.2010]


EVERARD, Jerry

2000 Virtual States. The Internet and the boundaries of the nation state. London/ New York: Routledge.


GARFINKEL, Simson

2000 Welcome to Sealand. Now Bugger Off. Wired Magazine, 8.07, July 2000. [Online: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.07/haven.html 26.06.2010].


KOCHTA- KALLEINEN, Oliver (Hg.)

2005 Amorph!03 – Summit of Micronations/ Protocols. Helsinki: Artists’ Association MUU.


KREMSER, Manfred

1999 CyberAnthropology und die neuen Räume des Wissens. In: Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft Wien; CXXIX. Band; Herausgegeben von der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien. Horn-Wien: Verlag Ferdinand Berger & Söhne.


LATTAS, Judy

2009 Queer Sovereignity: the Gay & Lesbian Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.1. 2009. [Online:

epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/mcs/article/download/883/1234 22.04.2010].

2005 DIY Sovereignty and the Popular Right in Australia. Macquarie University. [Online: www.crsi.mq.edu.au/documents/mobile_boundaries_rigid_worlds/lattas.pdf 22.04.2010]


LORENZMEIER, Stefan und Christian ROHDE

2003 Völkerrecht. Schnell erfasst. Berlin/ Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.


MIHM, Stephen

2000 Utopian Rulers, and Spoofs, Stake Out Territory. The New York Times, 25. Mai 2000. [Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/technology/utopian-rulers-and-spoofs-stake- out-territory-online.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all – 22.04.2010].


Nettlau, Max

1909 Panarchy. A forgotten idea of 1860. [Online: http://www.panarchy.org/nettlau/1909.eng.html 26.06.2010]


ZIPS, Werner

2002      Theorie einer gerechten Praxis oder: Die Macht ist wie ein Ei. Wien: WUV-Univ.-Verlag.





*   The present text consists of excerpts from the master’s thesis:

Irina Ulrike Andel, 2010: MICRONATIONS. Konstituierte Staaten in konstruierten Welten. Zur historischen Entwicklung von Mikronationen und ihren gegenwärtigen Ausprägungen. [“MICRONATIONS. Constituted States in Constructed Worlds. On the Historical Development of Micronations and their Current Forms”] Unpublished master’s thesis, Institute for Cultural and Social Anthropology, Vienna.

[1] Many diverse terms and concepts are subsumed under the umbrella term “micronation,” e.g. cybernation/-utopia, microstate, model country/state, artificial state, pseudo-state, virtual nation, web-state, art country, ephemeral state, extra-territorial state, imaginary country, invented kingdom, libertarian oasis, new country project, state-like entity, unrecognized (-nation), etc.

[2] Cf. Lattas 2005

[3] In the European Protestant Reformation and the late Enlightenment.

[4] However, European religious sects were not the first to flee to America after being persecuted in Europe. Captain John Smith’s exhibition to Virginia in 1605, and the arrival of the Mayflower Pilgrims fifteen years later, are considered to be the historical markers of early colonization. Both of them, Smith in Jamestown and the Pilgrims in Plymouth, conducted communistic experiments for practical reasons. In neither case did these settlers view communism as a moral or economic ideal (cf. Holloway 1951: 31).

[5] Cf. Kochta-Kalleinen 2005: 40

[6] Cf. ibid. 42

[7] Kochta- Kalleinen 2005: 43

[8] Cf. Lorenzmeier/ Rohde 2003: 115

[9] ibid. 117f [translation: TL]

[10] Cf. Kochta- Kalleinen 2005: 48 and Nettlau 1909

[11] Cf. Kremser 1999: 285

[12] Ibid. [Translation: TL]

[13] Cf. Blumberg 2000, Baker 2009, Garfinkel 2000, Beschizza 2007

[14] Cf. Mihm 2000

[15] Everard: 2000: xviii

[16] Cf. Everard 2000: 42

[17] Cf. Kremser 1999: 285

[18] Cf. Ibid.

[19] Lorenzmeier/ Rohde 2003: 72 [Translation: TL]

[20] For micronations, the most common reason for secession would be the non-recognition of self-determination. However, micronations do not consist of peoples or legal subjects in the terms of international law. In the ‘real’ world, the most common grounds for secession are serious violations of human rights, whereby in Europe, where standards of human rights are very high, these can be defined quite differently than in other countries and continents.

[21] Lattas 2009: 138

[22] De facto recognition can also occur by receiving an entrance or exit stamp in a passport.

[23] Lorenzmeier/Rohde 2003: 64 [Translation: TL]

[24] Examples of so-called stabilized de facto regimes include the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and many others.

[25] Zips 2002: 31 [Translation: TL]

[26] Cutterham

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